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Clearing rate

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Last updated 1 year ago

Generally speaking, the clearing rate is determined by sorting revealed bids and offers and passing the result into an (on-chain) algorithm that searches for an interest rate where supply meets demand. The logic can be found in the internal function _calculateClearingPrice, which runs our clearing price algorithm that seeks to maximize the total volume matched between borrowers and lenders at any given interest rate.

Second-price auction

In practice, there will typically be a range of interest rates that lead to the same equilibrium. Say, for example, the most competitive bid eligible for matching is 3.5% and the most competitive offer eligible for matching is 3.0%. In this example, any interest rate between 3.0% and 3.5% will result the same allocation. A simple solution would be to split the difference by setting the clearing rate at the midpoint between 3.0% and 3.5% (e.g. 3.25%). This solution, however, is vulnerable to situations where participants could be incentivized to manipulate the clearing price slightly in their favor by systematically "shading" their bids/offers. To avoid this type of strategic behavior, the Protocol takes the average between the second most competitive bid and second most competitive offer in determining the clearing rate following . By implementing this solution, participants are encouraged to report bid/offer their true valuations.

McAffee 1992